

FOLDER

J / P

↑
Top

0-0-0

x ~~Secret~~ SUMMARY
x Weekly Meeting

"THE ADVANCE AGAINST ROMMEL IN AFRICA."

As reported at the J.I.C. Meeting in LONDON,
November 18, 1942.

Despite rearguard actions at BUQBUQ, SOLUM, HALFYA and BARDIA, the British advance has made about 50 miles a day. TOBRUK was reached on the 13th and German departure was so heavy that the port was undamaged save for British bombing, and it was opened for use on the 16th. MATRUH and BARDIA are both being used and the RR to CAPUZZO will be opened by the 21st.

The forces which may gather at EL AGHEILA will comprise 10,000 Germans, 30,000 Italians, and 10,000 lines of communications forces.

Forward fields of the enemy airforce are now S. of BENGAZI and will soon be located behind EL AGHEILA. There has been a notable lack of opposition from the enemy A.F. partly due to the speed and continuity of their withdrawal with consequent disturbance of supply and partly to the enemy policy of conservation in his attempt to maintain what force he has for the support of his troops when they make a stand.

Mr. Kimer

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

J. G. C. 9476-
x London
x weekly meeting
SECRET

TO: Colonel William J. Donovan December 7, 1942
FROM: William L. Langer
SUBJECT: JIC MEETING - LONDON

Attached is a copy of the report sent to us from London on the Weekly Meeting of the Combined JIC group there.

With the resumption of our regular cable facilities, we soon should again be receiving this report weekly by cable.

William L. Langer

Attachment

J.I.C. Meeting - London November 18, 1942.

LIBYA: Various rearguard actions were fought at Buqbuq, Sollum, Halfaya and Bardia, but the British advance has been about 50 miles a day. Tobruk was reached on the 13th, and German departure was so hasty that the port was undamaged, save from British bombing, and it was opened for use on the 16th. Matruh and Bardia are both being used and the railway will be opened to Capuzzo by the 21st.

It is estimated that the forces that may gather at El Aghella will comprise 10,000 Germans, 70,000 Italians, and 10,000 lines of communications forces. Equipment will include 150 field and medium guns, 300 anti-tank guns, and 80 tanks of which some have come from Tripoli. Otherwise no tank reinforcements are known, and one ship with tanks was turned back to Italy.

The 90th Light Division is now west of Cyrene, probably in the neighbourhood of Barce. The 15th and 21st Panzer Divisions, plus the 22nd. Italian Corps are between Barce and Bengasi. The rest of the forces are between Bengasi and Agadabia. A fresh Italian division - the Spezia - has advanced from Tripoli and is taking up its positions among the fortifications at El Aghella.

Forward fields of the enemy airforce are now south of Bengasi and will soon be located behind El Aghella. There has been a notable lack of opposition from the enemy A.F., partly due to the speed and continuity of their withdrawal with consequent disturbance of supply, and partly to the enemy policy of conservation in his attempt to maintain what force he has for the support of his troops when they make a stand. The force is estimated to comprise 175 planes of which 90 are fighters and 80, or 80, dive-bombers. There has been no information that there are air reinforcements in this area.

Two small ships reached Bengasi, but one of them moved out towards the south and was sunk upon its return. It appears never to have unloaded. One tanker of 10,000 tons was sunk south of Messina. Some small coasting craft have assisted in evacuation westwards of Bengasi.

Three battleships, of the Littorio class, have moved from Taranto to Naples escorted by six destroyers. Three of cruisers mentioned last week, have moved from Navarin to Messina, but two of the escorting destroyers were sunk. At Tripoli five torpedo boats are concentrated, and at Palermo three, perhaps four, fairly large supply ships have gathered with the probable intention of sailing to Tunis or Bizerta.

- 2 -

SECRET

NORTHWEST AFRICA: The operations of American and British forces were described as on schedule - the advance into Tunis being as deep as originally planned, but not as deep as was perhaps hoped. All the ports are useable with the worst difficulty at Oran where of the three ships sunk by the French across the mouth of the harbor, only one has so far been removed. Advance forces of parachute troops, both American and British, have moved forward into Tunis along both the coastal and the inland route.

Five ships have reached Bizerta and two have reached Tunis. The estimate of Axis forces in that area on the 13th was about 8,000 and that figure since then has remained unchanged. These forces are considered to be strong in anti-aircraft, and to have some tanks - even 25 tonners.

Five days ago it was estimated that 30 German submarines were operating in the western basin. The number has now decreased to 12 or 15 with an equal number of Italian submarines. The recently announced figure of sub losses is now regarded as a little high and the figures are now 8 submarines lost for certain and 8 possibly damaged. In addition, the enemy has lost 3 destroyers and one cruiser, and one cruiser damaged.

SECRET

- 3 -

FRANCE: The occupation of Vichy France has occasioned no change in the total number of German troops. The occupying forces comprised two armored divisions, one motorized S.S. and 3 to 5 infantry, or training, divisions; also Italian forces, comprising one motorized and two infantry divisions. The south coastal area is divided into three zones of which the western, up to Toulon, is the German sphere, Toulon itself is French, and thence to the east is Italian. The Italian zone extends behind Toulon as far as Aix.

The G.A.F. in southern France is expected to consist of 150 - 200 planes - a few of them first-line aircraft and bombers, but the larger part second-line reserve or training aircraft which would normally be described as non-operational. They, perhaps, will be mainly defensive but they will include a small striking force and some reconnaissances. The occupation, therefore, will have only slight effect on the airforce of the western front.

The unusually strong opposition by FW 190s encountered yesterday over St. Nazaire probably means that 30 of these planes were moved there from the Calais region. Flights of fighter bombers over England have ceased, and this may mean that those planes have moved southward.

In answer to a question it was stated that L.R.B. available in the west were 150 of which only 100 were serviceable.

Since the first signs in the Mediterranean region of possible offensive action in October, some 400 planes have been transferred there from Russia and of this movement half has taken place in the last 10 days.

GERMAN NAVY: The "Hipper" and "Koln" are in northern Norway with four destroyers; the "Tirpitz" and "Bismarck" at Trondhjem with 3 destroyers; the "Scheer", "Lutao", and "Leipzig" are in the Baltic, where also the "Prince Regent" is on its trials and Germany has the "Scharnhorst", "Gneisenau" and the "Graf Zeppelin".

Some 25 to 30 subs. are operating in the Atlantic spread more thinly than usual between Iceland, Trinidad, Brazil and Freetown. The worst spot is off Trinidad where 5 or 6 subs. were said to be "too successful". Two or three are still off the South East coast of Africa. Some 25 per cent of the subs., which are usually operating on trade routes, are now oriented upon the operations in North Africa. Total operative German subs. are 230 including 2 small 250 tonners in the Black Sea.

- 4 -

SECRET

RUSSIA: In the north and centre are nothing but local operations. There are indications that the Russians are building up strength south-west of Moscow.

In the Caucasus the Germans are on the defense east of Alaghir. At Tuapse they are making no progress. There are indications, both in the Caucasus and at Stalingrad, that the German army is experiencing shortage of petrol.

In the air the scale of operations of the G.A.F. against the Caucasus and Stalingrad has been much reduced during the last month. There are signs here too of fuel shortage.

In general it was stated that the German Air Force is distributed 50 per cent in Russia and 25 percent each on the western and Mediterranean fronts. Expectation is that a fairly strong force will remain in Russia regardless of commitments elsewhere.

Green
Admiral

- 5 -

SECRET

FAR EAST:

BURMA: Press reports of Jap. reinforcements are not confirmed. The J.A.F. remains 200 with 100 in Siam and northern Indo-China. One raid is recorded by six heavy bombers and 20 fighters on some coastal launches near Akyab.

In NEW Guinea at Oivi the Japs lost 700 men out of two battalions. The Wairopi bridge has been restored by the Australians. The coastal force has reached a spot 15 miles from Buna. There are 2,000 Japs in the area. The air force, in which an increase was reported a fortnight ago, has now dwindled almost to nothing, but reinforcements are expected.

In the SOLOMONS Jap troops amount to 20 or 30,000. The air force is reckoned at about 180. Three notable air actions were recorded in one of which 17 Jap planes were destroyed out of 42 and in another 30 out of 33. The results of the naval action of November 12/13 equalises the Jap and Allied force except in respect of carriers. The principal concentration of forces is now at Rabaul with a lighter force at Buin and Shortland Island.

In the Aleutian Islands the Japs have re-occupied Attu. Their strength in the islands is 10,000. Based in either the Aleutian Islands or the Kurile Islands are one eight-inch and three five-inch cruisers.

In the INDIAN OCEAN two raiders attacked a tanker and escort 500 miles south of the Cocos Islands and one raider was sunk by the escort. Subs are active off Madras and Ceylon.

P.O.C. 9266
x British
SECRET Representative

November 27, 1942

Major General George V. Strong,
Senior Member, Joint Security Control,
Room 2 E 776,
Pentagon Bldg.,
Arlington, Va.

My dear General Strong:

✓ Major Bruce has reported to me that the question was raised at the meeting yesterday of British representation on the JIC Committee. I think that any such arrangement would be as unwise at this time as it would be for us to be represented on the British JIC.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

6.6.3
SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

J.I.C. 9266-
x British
x Representation

TO: Col. Donovan

FROM: David Bruce

DATE: November 27, 1942

SUBJECT:

At the JIC meeting yesterday the question was raised of British representation on the American JIC Committee which would, in effect, make it a combined Committee. I stated, as did Mr. Berle's substitute, that I would refer the matter to my principal. General Strong requested that an answer be given as soon as convenient. Personally, I think that such a combination would be most unwise for reasons that I could develop in conversation. The other members of the JIC Committee (excluding State & OSS) were against the proposal.

D. B.

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

L. G. P. 12822
x Radio Intelligence
x dissemination
x O.S.S.
x F.D.R.

October 21, 1942

Major General George V. Strong
Room 2416, Munitions Bldg
Washington, D.C.

Dear General Strong:

Upon reading the "Draft of a Memorandum for the President" dealing with a proposed dissemination of Radio Intelligence, I note that OSS is wholly excluded from any access to such material.

Believing that such action would impair the ability of OSS to discharge its mission I feel it my duty to have a dissent filed before the J.I.C. tomorrow when the matter is considered.

I feel that you should have advance notice of our intention concerning this matter.

Very sincerely

William J. Donovan
Director

SECRET

October 22, 1942

MEMORANDUM TO: The Joint Intelligence Committee
FROM: William J. Donovan, Director of
The Office of Strategic Services

The following comments are respectfully submitted on the "Draft of a Memorandum for the President" prepared by the Director of Naval Intelligence and dealing with a proposed dissemination of Radio Intelligence. It is requested that this dissent to the proposed draft be made a part of the record of whatever action is taken.

At the time the Director of OSS was asked to refrain from cryptographic work he understood that the proceeds resulting from the decoding by the Armed Forces would be made available to him. Upon that understanding he agreed he would not undertake any cryptographic work. The present draft entirely eliminates OSS from any participation in this work. However, I do not rely upon this point but rather upon the following considerations:

SECRET

Page 2

It seems most unreasonable that OSS specifically charged by the Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff with a duty "to operate an organization for the collection of information through espionage" and "to execute subversive activities" should be excluded from any source of information - however secret - which will aid OSS in accomplishing these assigned missions.

SI representatives in foreign countries are entitled to the protection and assistance derived from a knowledge of intercepted enemy messages. Such intelligence frequently constitutes a warning of important impending events in specific localities. SI representatives can be directed to such localities without delay. The same reasoning applies with equal force to SO representatives.

The R. & A. Branch would be greatly aided in their strategic studies by receiving certain economic and political material which will aid them in their evaluations for the J.I.C. For example, tremendous demands are being made upon the Mediterranean desk in R. & A. for North African data of every character.

SECRET

Page 3

There is every evidence that these studies are regarded as important basic documents. The most valuable information which our Economic Section could have concerning developments of Japanese economic strength and capabilities would be intercepted messages which reveal the character of tonnage and number of ships carrying raw materials into Japan such as bauxite from Malaya or oil from Borneo.

Representatives abroad of OSS have been given important staff responsibilities by the Theater and Task Commanders. If intercepted information reveals the presence of new airfields, roads, bridges, docks, fortifications or communication facilities, and OSS is not informed its service will be less valuable.

The importance of security in this matter is fully recognized by OSS. It is understood to be vital that intercepted material should be restricted to a limited number of approved people in every agency concerned with its use.

Page 4

SECRET

The OSS, by the very nature of its activities, is already charged with a vast amount of most secret material. To exclude this Agency from the processed intercepts can imply only that the material is not considered pertinent to the work of the OSS or that there is a question as to the loyalty, the intelligence or discretion of OSS or the manner in which it would guard its security. This Agency seeks to know which of these points are now raised and to be given an opportunity to meet such an issue.

f.0.3

X
X Japan
X Babcock

September 9, 1942

MEMORANDUM

FOR: The Secretary of the Joint Intelligence Committee

FROM: The Director, Office of Strategic Services

At the request of Captain Buford, I am forwarding two copies of a paper prepared by Lieutenant Colonel C. Stanton Babcock.

William J. Donovan
Director

a Study of Land Operations
in the Far East
12/8/41 - 6/8/42
in a Japanese house
L Stanton Babcock
Lt Col Cavalry

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Handwritten: J. I. C. Papers 7894
evaluation
x (R. Low)
SECRET

August 13, 1942

MEMORANDUM

TO Colonel William J. Donovan
FROM Edward S. Mason

I am attaching an evaluation of J.I.C. papers to date, prepared at my suggestion by my assistant, Walt Rostow. I think you may be interested in this comparison between predictions in J.I.C. papers and what has subsequently happened.

Handwritten: E. S. M.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

SECRET

August 12, 1942

MEMORANDUM

TO E. S. Mason
FROM T. W. Hootow
SUBJECT Enemy Intentions and Capabilities as Evaluated in Papers of
Joint U. S. Intelligence Committee

NOTE: Only those papers containing judgments on which subsequent events have permitted verification are examined here.

I. FAR EASTERN THEATER

A. Aleutians (J.I.C. 14, May 7, 1942).

1. The possibility of Japanese action against the Aleutians was correctly envisaged, as was the timing of such an operation ("sooner rather than later").
2. Raids, rather than an effort to secure lodgement in the Aleutians, were regarded as the most likely Japanese course.
3. Three types of action to secure lodgement were examined: direct attack on Dutch Harbor; simultaneous action against Dutch Harbor and Eastern Siberia (including Kamchatka); and a step-by-step advance up Kamchatka to the Aleutians. Of these the latter, representing "standard Japanese procedure in combined operations in this war", appears to have been regarded as the most likely Japanese course, if an effort to secure lodgement were made. The possibility of an attempt directly to secure lodgement in the western Aleutian islands was not explicitly examined.
4. In examining the "Influence of Weather and Climate", the possible role of bad weather, in screening naval and landing operations from hostile aircraft, was not examined.

B. Australia and New Zealand (C.I.C. 2, February 27, 1942).

1. Japanese reluctance to undertake a full scale invasion of Australia and New Zealand was correctly evaluated.

-2-

SECRET

2. In J.I.C. 5/3 (April 25, 1942), the Solomon Islands were indicated as the probable immediate limit to the Japanese attempt to extend their island barrier to the south-east.
3. In C.I.C. of April 30, 1942 ("Axis Intentions for 1942") it is stated as "probable" that, as a defensive maneuver, the Japanese would "deny" Darwin. The limit of Japanese occupation is again stated to be the Solomon Islands, although the special interest of the Japanese in New Caledonian nickel is noted.

C. Other Areas

1. C.I.C. of April 30, 1942, emphasizes the possibility of a Japanese attempt to occupy Assam and Bengal, and of air raids on the Calcutta area. Such action has not yet developed.
2. The same document states: "Japan is likely to avoid a decisive encounter with the U. S. Pacific Fleet". In general, the possibility of a serious effort to occupy Midway or the Hawaiian Islands was not envisaged.

II. MIDDLE EASTERN THEATER

1. C.I.C. 4/3, May 7, 1942 ("German Capabilities in Syria and Iraq") expresses the belief that, despite the neutralization of Malta, Allied naval weakness in the Mediterranean, and the consequent flow of supplies to Rommel that "he can not stage a major offensive successfully without additional armored divisions. Such reinforcements as he is receiving appear to be sufficient only to enable him to undertake a limited objective offensive designed to prevent our forces from being diverted elsewhere". The correctness of this judgment depends upon the relative extent to which German supplies, Rommel's ability, and British incompetence are held responsible for subsequent German success in this theater.
2. The same document emphasizes the difficulties inherent in any German overseas operation against the Syrian coast. The prior acquisition of Anatolian air bases is regarded as a necessary condition for the reduction of Cyprus. The course of operations in the Eastern Mediterranean in the past three months is compatible with this view.
3. C.I.C. 4/5, May 23, 1942 ("German Capabilities in Turkey") develops the view, thus far borne out, that the costs of a

-3-

SECRET

German operation against Turkey far outweigh probable gains, in view of present German commitments and the diversion required to achieve decisive results.

XII. EASTERN EUROPEAN THEATER

1. C.I.C., of April 30, 1942 ("Axis Intentions for 1942") exposed certain differences of opinion in the British and American J.I.C. views of relative German-Russian strength, and of the consequent course of operations in Russia in 1942. It was agreed, however, that the German commitment in Russia was sufficient to preclude major offensive ground operations in other theaters (except Libya-Egypt), until Russian strength had been substantially reduced. This judgment appears thus far to have been correct.
2. The British view of winter operations lead to the conclusion that the German offensive spearhead would be seriously limited, and that a major offensive in the South alone could be envisaged "with subsequent operations against Moscow and Leningrad for political purposes". The American view was that, with German strength substantially unimpaired, a final effort would be made to destroy the Russian mass.
3. It was agreed that the first major effort would come in the South. The British, however, emphasized consistently that this drive would move purposefully towards the Caucasian oil fields, which supplies were needed by Germany "for industrial purposes". The U. S. J.I.C. deprecated the German need for oil, and envisaged the drive in the South as a battle of annihilation. It was predicted that the weight of attack would shift to the northeast in the direction of Gorki, to be joined by other drives designed to encircle and destroy the Russian mass in the center.
4. It was agreed that, in the course of the southern drive, simultaneous pressure would be exerted in the north and center to contain Russian forces. Diversionary action on other sectors of the front thus far appears to have been initiated by Russia rather than Germany (Voronezh, Rzhnev, Vukhov).
5. In general, it appears too early to judge the relative accuracy of the two views. The following, however, are to be noted:
 - (a) The Germans have thrown a considerable force into the northwest Caucasus, and occupied the Maikop fields with dispatch;

SECRET

- (b) The Germans have not claimed the capture of large masses of Russian troops; moreover, their tactics, involving a series of diverging rather than converging drives, do not appear to have been designed primarily for this purpose.
- (c) Although the weight of attack may shift subsequently to the northeast, the German advance has met least success in the Vereshch-Linski area where rail junctions and bases essential for a northeastward thrust are located.
6. The opening of the German drive in the south came some three weeks later (June 28) than the date indicated as most likely (June 8).

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

WASHINGTON, D. C.

✓ SC : 6796
*France
File

June 3, 1942

MEMORANDUM

TO Colonel William J. Donovan
FROM Edward S. Mason

I am attaching the draft of a paper on France as an Active Axis Ally, which will be discussed at the J.I.C. tomorrow afternoon. This is the only paper to be discussed at that meeting. An Appendix on the French Battle Order, ground, sea, and air will be added.

E. S. M.

CONFIDENTIAL *Serial 67802*~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

- X Navy
- X Chemical Analysis
- X Enemy material
- X Suggestion

7/8/47

7 file

"J. S. C."

William J. Donovan
 Joint Intelligence Committee
 S.A. #8888

I invite the attention of the Committee to the communication of the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance of the Navy Department to the Coordinator of Research and Development, of which a copy is attached, in relation to chemical analysis of enemy material and evaluation in respect to economic warfare.

The argument in the paper referred to seems to me well taken. I feel, however, that such analysis should be contemplated in respect to the armed forces as a whole, and not only in respect to the Navy. While different officers would, of course, assess the pattern, type, new inventions, etc. of captured material specifically for the Army and Navy and their air components, nevertheless the analysis would give results affecting the general situation of the enemy and might give vital assistance both to the Board of Economic Warfare and to the services of the OSS.

It would, therefore, seem advantageous for the Committee to enter upon a study to the end of formulating a plan for overall operation in respect of captured material, such plan to be submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for approval.

Enclosure (1)

July 21, 1942

MEMORANDUM

FOR: Mr. Hugh Wilson

FROM: Mr. J. R. Murphy

✓ Replying to your memorandum of July 20, I think you will find that "the other paper" to which Colonel Donovan refers was the memorandum prepared by you for the JIC attaching communication of the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance of the Navy Department to the Coordinator of Research and Development.

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM: Hugh R. Wilson
TO: Mr. James R. Murphy
SUBJECT:

DATE July 20, 1942

I enclose herewith copy of a memorandum dated July 18 from Colonel Donovan. Would you mind asking him what is "our other paper." Does he refer to the Dragon Project?

Hugh R. Wilson


Attachment

SECRET

(COPY)

July 18, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR HUGH WILSON:

I am prepared to make this request of Marshall after they have passed upon our other paper. I think he would not be willing to act on this without having the other submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

W. J. D.

(Above memorandum attached to memorandum to General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, War Department, concerning analysis and scientific examination of captured German war material held by Russia)


SECRET

J. J. C. 4780
x British
x Enemy Equip.
x Captured Material
XBBB
BRITISH EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D.C.
June 8, 1942

SECRET

Dear Col. Donovan,

I was very glad to have the opportunity of meeting you at lunch on Saturday and hope that I shall have the pleasure of seeing you again.

One of the things that I am most interested in, and which I believe you are looking into, is the whole question of examination and analysis of captured enemy material. In England we have found this invaluable and while the Services naturally are primarily interested in this material from their own Services point of view, such examination often turns out to be one of the most valuable sources of economic intelligence.

Yours sincerely,

B. J. M. Bobb
B. J. M. Bobb (Lieut.-Col.)

Col. William J. Donovan,
Coordinator of Information,
Administration Building,
25th and E Streets, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C.

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

INTEROFFICE MEMO

SECRET

British
X Enemy Equipment
X Captured Material

File
 DATE June 6, 1942

FROM: Hugh R. Wilson
 To: Colonel Donovan
 SUBJECT: S.A. File #8175

PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS ON THE BRITISH
 MEMORANDUM TO J.I.C. RESPECTING
 CAPTURED ENEMY EQUIPMENT.

PRESENT BRITISH PRACTICE

After reading the report handed to Mr. Mason, I have discussed British practice with Colonel Debb and Group Captain Du Boulay. It appears that each unit of the British forces--land, sea, and air--has a separate organization for the purpose of examination of captured material. The practice of the British Air Force was described to me in some detail.

During the battle of Britain in the summer of '40, a member of the Examination Unit was assigned to each locality, in England. His first task was to plant guards, local police, or home guards over every fallen airplane which landed in his area to prevent destruction by souvenir hunters, etc. Frequently, wide search had to be made as the material was strewn over a considerable area. On notification of the crash of an enemy airplane by the local officer, Headquarters sent out experts. They examined in detail design, mechanism, guns, instruments and, at the same time, technicians took samples of materials for analysis and examination. Also, the gasoline was broken down to establish its consistency. Serial numbers of motors and factories from which delivered were carefully noted and wide knowledge of points of origin as well as rate of production was obtained thereby.

Highly valuable information concerning economical matters was developed by the analyses.

Captain Du Boulay tells me that an officer who has done service in this Unit will shortly arrive in the United States and he will put me in touch with him.

I have not been able as yet to find representatives of the British Army and Navy Units of like character.

I asked Captain Du Boulay whether they had made arrangements to send officers behind the Russian lines in order to check on captured material there since the harvest there was doubtless large. The Captain replied in the negative, adding that they had told their military fellow in Russia to ask the Russians for

SECRET

COORDINATION OF INFORMATION

- 2 -

permission to have British officers present when prisoners were interviewed; that the British military officer in Russia had replied that he had not even proffered the request as he knew how offended it would make the Russians.

SITUATION IN USA ARMY

I have taken up with Colonel Butler the problem of ascertaining what the army is doing or plans to do in this connection. He tells me that he will go into the matter at once with a view of informing himself as to the situation.

NAVY

I also discussed the matter with Commander Ravenel. The latter, however, informed me that the Navy regards this particular thing as extremely confidential. He invited me to prepare a memorandum on the subject which he would take to his superior officers in order to ascertain what might be done about it.

In the light of the foregoing paragraph, I am reluctant to prepare such a memorandum unless you explicitly so direct. Perhaps I made an error in not going higher in my initial step. In any case, I hesitate to go further on this phase of the matter until I have your advice.

GENERAL

It would, of course, be very advantageous if J.I.C. should determine to designate C.O.I. as the coordinating unit for this activity to supplement by technical civilian examination, the examining units set up by Army, Navy, Air. Such decision would give us access to full information and enable study to be made intelligently.

It jumps to the eye, of course, that the most practical study that we could make of German equipment would be in collaboration with the Russians. This type of request would not be asking the Russians to reveal any of their own secrets, but merely to share with us the secrets of the Germans. They must have a mass of captured material and it is certain that careful scrutiny by qualified persons--officers and civilians--could not fail to be of the highest benefit.

Australia would seem to offer a possible laboratory experiment for the installation by American forces of an Examination Unit. General MacArthur is in control, submarines have been sunk in Sydney harbor, Japanese airplanes have doubtless come down. As

- 3 -

operations develop further, equipment will probably fall into our hands. As I understand it, there is a measure of iron and steel production in Australia which would allow for laboratory analysis on the spot. I believe that this possibility could well be explored.

WAW

↑
TO:

Murphy

*Thanks - I have
just received a copy
from Debb*

From the desk of
HUGH R. WILSON

Even No. 10111

Exposure is 1/25 @ f.6.3

REPORTING OFFICER'S NAME
DATE
TO
FROM
SUBJECT

1. [Illegible text]

2. [Illegible text]

3. [Illegible text]

4. [Illegible text]

5. [Illegible text]

6. [Illegible text]

7. [Illegible text]

8. [Illegible text]

9. [Illegible text]

10. [Illegible text]

11. [Illegible text]

12. [Illegible text]

13. [Illegible text]

14. [Illegible text]

15. [Illegible text]

16. [Illegible text]

17. [Illegible text]

18. [Illegible text]

19. [Illegible text]

20. [Illegible text]

21. [Illegible text]

22. [Illegible text]

23. [Illegible text]

24. [Illegible text]

25. [Illegible text]

26. [Illegible text]

27. [Illegible text]

28. [Illegible text]

29. [Illegible text]

30. [Illegible text]

31. [Illegible text]

32. [Illegible text]

33. [Illegible text]

34. [Illegible text]

35. [Illegible text]

36. [Illegible text]

37. [Illegible text]

38. [Illegible text]

39. [Illegible text]

40. [Illegible text]

41. [Illegible text]

42. [Illegible text]

43. [Illegible text]

44. [Illegible text]

45. [Illegible text]

46. [Illegible text]

47. [Illegible text]

48. [Illegible text]

49. [Illegible text]

50. [Illegible text]

51. [Illegible text]

52. [Illegible text]

53. [Illegible text]

54. [Illegible text]

55. [Illegible text]

56. [Illegible text]

57. [Illegible text]

58. [Illegible text]

59. [Illegible text]

60. [Illegible text]

61. [Illegible text]

62. [Illegible text]

63. [Illegible text]

64. [Illegible text]

65. [Illegible text]

66. [Illegible text]

67. [Illegible text]

68. [Illegible text]

69. [Illegible text]

70. [Illegible text]

71. [Illegible text]

72. [Illegible text]

73. [Illegible text]

74. [Illegible text]

75. [Illegible text]

76. [Illegible text]

77. [Illegible text]

78. [Illegible text]

79. [Illegible text]

80. [Illegible text]

81. [Illegible text]

82. [Illegible text]

83. [Illegible text]

84. [Illegible text]

85. [Illegible text]

86. [Illegible text]

87. [Illegible text]

88. [Illegible text]

89. [Illegible text]

90. [Illegible text]

91. [Illegible text]

92. [Illegible text]

93. [Illegible text]

94. [Illegible text]

95. [Illegible text]

96. [Illegible text]

97. [Illegible text]

98. [Illegible text]

99. [Illegible text]

100. [Illegible text]

C.E.W.M. [unclear]

[unclear] [unclear]

[unclear]

3-11-2

[unclear]

INFORMATION FROM CAPTURED GERMAN EQUIPMENT

1. British experience has been that the examination of captured enemy equipment is of the highest possible importance as providing technical data from which tactical and operational lessons can be learned, our own designs can profit, and information on the present and future state of enemy production and on probable technical developments be obtained.

2. The following examples from British experience illustrate the foregoing:

(a) From the earliest period of the war, each captured German aircraft was immediately inspected on the spot by technical personnel including German officers. Particular attention was paid to any manufacturing differences, performance and to any changes in design or equipment. The information so obtained was immediately disseminated to operational units in the form of briefs, and the most important points of interest were always made available to the highest command.

Particularly the aircraft was examined for any signs that might indicate the type and construction.

The aircraft was then subjected to a more detailed examination by a technical staff, and the results were reported to the appropriate command. In some cases, the aircraft was taken to the home country for further examination.

(b) In the latter part of the war, a detailed description and reporting of captured German aircraft was made by a technical staff, and the results were reported to the appropriate command. In some cases, the aircraft was taken to the home country for further examination.

(c) Apart from the value of information on the state of production, it is necessary to obtain the value of information on the production of enemy equipment. Examination of a captured enemy aircraft revealed the place of manufacture of many important components, the value of the information is to be used to obtain information on the state of production.

It should be noted that this type of information can be obtained by the examination of captured German equipment, and the results are reported to the appropriate command.

(d) There is yet a further type of data the value of which, in British experience, shown in the field and research establishments have been still more to obtain. Captured equipment of all kinds may reveal unsuspected weaknesses or other important weaknesses in the enemy war material situation.

The technical contents of captured German equipment, for example, the state of the art, and a number of times has revealed a progressive improvement in quality and standard over estimates of the German war material.

It is important to note that the results of examination of captured equipment are not only of value to the supply departments but profit.

The analysis....

3. The British J.I.C., Washington, ventured to draw the attention of the U.S. J.I.C. to this matter and to suggest that consideration might be given to the best methods of exchanging information, under the following headings, from captured enemy material. Since it is to be expected that British Services would be better able to examine German equipment while American Services would be better able to examine Japanese equipment, the British J.I.C. would be glad to discuss with the U.S. J.I.C., should they think it necessary, how best to exchange information as desired.

5-1-75



JDC Sub Com 1506

X Jester, Perry
 X Africa
 X Luce, Luce

May 18, 1942

MEMORANDUM

To: David Williamson
 From: W. J. D.

Please have your people read the attached memorandum from Dr. Mason. What I am interested in is the suggestion from Perry Jester that we might win over various Vichy agents in Africa. I would like to have your views as to whether Jester should be talked with and that suggestion of his explored.

✓ Please return the enclosure, after it has served your purpose.

John A. J. I. C. Sub Committee
 hunting and Detours by Claire Luce

Am. Joint Intelligence Comm. 4505
X Com. Chief of Staff

April 5, 1948

Admiral Ernest T. Wilkinson
Chairman, Joint Intelligence Committee
Washington, D. C.

My dear Admiral Wilkinson:

Since it will be impossible for me to attend the J.I.C. meeting on Monday April 6, I have asked Major David Bruce to attend and represent me in my absence. I have gone over the pending projects with him.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

Material

THE JOINT BOARD
Joint Intelligence Committee
Washington

Chas. E. / 3/5/53
STG
710/3
OWI
Q-2
Col

March 6, 1942

OFFICE MEMORANDUM NO. 11

SUBJECT: Reorganization of the Joint Intelligence Committee

In conformity with CCS 23/1, the Joint Intelligence Committee has been reorganized as follows:

1. Joint Intelligence Committee.

Rear Admiral T. S. Wilkinson, Director of Naval Intelligence, Chairman.

Brigadier General Raymond E. Lee, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

Hon. Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State.

✓ Colonel William J. Donovan, Coordinator of Information.

Colonel R. B. Lord, Chief of Operations, Board of Economic Warfare.

Secretary: Major Ludwell L. Montague.

2. Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee.

Captain J. V. Ogan, U.S.N.

Col. Louis J. Fortier, U.S.A.

Col. Vincent J. Weloy, U.S.A.

Mr. Winthrop Murray Crane, Dept. of State.

Dr. Edward Mason, O.C.O.I.

Mr. Charles B. Rayner, B.E.W.

Cmdr. J. H. Foskett, U.S.N.

Lieut. Cmdr. H. L. Abbott, U.S.N.R.

Lieut. Cmdr. W. T. Kenny, U.S.N.

Major Ludwell L. Montague, U.S.A., Secretary.

3. Attached Officers.

Lieut. W. M. McGovern, U.S.N.R.

Captain A. Sidney Buford, III, U.S.A., Asst. Secy.

Ensign S. R. Prentiss, U.S.N.R.

LUDWELL L. MONTAGUE,
Major, Cavalry,
Secretary, J.I.C.

American Joint Intelligence

x Can. Intelligence

x State

x I.W.B.

x C.I.

x U.N.F.

x G.2

March 3, 1942

The Honorable

The Secretary of the Navy
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

In reply to your letter of February 16, request-
ing that two representatives of this office be nomi-
nated to serve with the American Joint Intelligence,

I am designating Dr. Edward S. Mason to serve with
the "Full Time Working Committee". In order to determine
the kind of representative of our organization we would
wish on the Senior Committee, I shall for the time being
designate myself.

I greatly appreciate your asking us to participate
with you in this work.

Respectfully,

Wm. J. Donovan
 [Signature]
 [Stamp: EXP-11-15-42 G.F.G.]

6 4555
SECRETTHE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON3 ✓
*American Joint Intelligence
Committee*(K) A8-1 (ANN)
Serial No. 047416

FEB 16 1942

Sir:

The attached directive (C.C.S.-23/1) by the Combined Chiefs of Staff provides for membership in the American Joint Intelligence Committee of appropriate representatives of the State Department, the Board of Economic Warfare and the Coordinator of Information, in addition to the Directors of the Intelligence Services of the Army and Navy.

In order to implement this directive, and, subject to your agreement, it is requested that two representatives of the Office of the Coordinator of Information be nominated, the senior to serve as a member of the American Joint Intelligence Committee (paragraph 3 of the enclosure); and the junior to serve with the "full time working Committee" of the American Joint Intelligence Committee (paragraph 4 of the enclosure).

Respectfully,



The Coordinator of Information,
Washington, D. C.

Enclosure

SECRET

U.S. SECRETCOPY NO. 54BRITISH MOST SECRETC.C.S. 23/1FEBRUARY 11, 1942COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFFDIRECTIVE BY THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

FOR

COMBINED INTELLIGENCE
(Reference C.C.S. 4th Meeting, Item 4.)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff, at a meeting held February 10, 1942, accepted paper C.C.S. 23 (attached hereto) as terms of reference for Combined Intelligence.

V. DYKES,

W. B. SMITH.

Combined Secretariat

ENCLOSURE

1. The proposals in this paper are intended to implement the following directives:

Extract from ABC-1;

"19 Existing Military Intelligence organizations of the two powers will operate as independent intelligence agencies, but will maintain close liaison with each other in order to ensure the full and prompt exchange of pertinent information concerning war operations. Intelligence liaison will be established not only through the Military Missions but also between all echelons of command in the field with respect to matters which affect their operations."

Extract from United States-British Chiefs of Staff Memo. "East Arcadia Collaboration," Annex 2 to Minutes of Chief of Staff Conference of January 14, 1942, ABC-1/JCCS-12;

"7. The question of the production and dissemination of complete Military Intelligence to serve the Combined

SECRET

Chiefs of Staff and Combined Staff Planners has been referred to the latter body for a report. Here also, it is contemplated that existing machinery will be largely continued."

2. The primary assumption is that there is to be mutual exchange of (a) the intelligence necessary to plan for combined operations with the British; (b) intelligence of the enemy in all areas, not only on higher levels, but in all echelons to include Military Attaches and observers.

3. The American Joint Intelligence Committee will be composed of the Directors of the Intelligence Services of the Army and Navy, and in addition appropriate representatives of the State Department, the Board of Economic Warfare and the Coordinator of Information. This Committee will be co-equal with, and on a status of mutual exchange with, the Joint Planning Committee, in the service of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

4. A full time working committee of the American J.I.C. composed of the members of the now existing Army-Navy J.I.C., with State Department, Economic Defense and C.O.I. representatives, will continue their present duties and will work in close cooperation with the British J.I.C. in Washington.

5. The Joint Intelligence Committees will freely exchange pertinent information concerning war operations. Acting as a Combined Intelligence Committee, they will prepare Combined Intelligence Estimates (Appreciations) and otherwise serve the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

6. In the field a close liaison will be maintained between American and British Intelligence organizations in order to ensure a mutual interchange of intelligence information.

SECRET

7. In matters of Counter Intelligence to combat subversive activities, espionage, etc., the Intelligence Services of the two Powers will continue their present activities, but wherever appropriate the Services will cooperate, through the individual Joint Intelligence Committees, with the Combined Intelligence Committee.

CCS 370.2 (2-16-42)

U.S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET
FEBRUARY 16, 1942

COPY NO. 19

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMBINED INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

Subject: Timing, rate of build up and scale of
German air attack to be expected at
Casablanca in the initial stages of
Super Gymnast.

1. The Combined Planners directed that the Secretaries refer the attached papers to the Combined Intelligence Committee with the request that that Committee furnish an agreed appreciation of the views set forth therein.
2. It is further requested that the Combined Intelligence Committee set forth the various hypotheses upon which their appreciation is based.

E. L. SIBERT,
P. O. A. DAVISON,
Combined Secretariat.

G2/I
JCH

February 14, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, WPD:

Subject: C.P.S. 2/2 -- Super Gymnast.

1. In reply to request in memorandum WPD, dated February 14, 1942, the following are submitted as the comments of the Military Intelligence Division on paragraphs 2, 3 and 4, "Scale of Air Attacks":

Should the Axis move into West and Northwest Africa their aircraft will form the advance element. Due to the availability of numerous bases and lines of communication through Spain, Sicily and North Africa, this move will not occasion any serious difficulty for the Axis. Air Force requirements would not be great and sufficient means are now available.

The Intelligence Division estimates that the Germans have a total of 750 aircraft based in Italy and Sicily with an additional 200 German aircraft in Spain. The Italians have a total combat airforce of approximately 1000 aircraft, including army observation types, which are now based in Italy and Sicily and are not engaged in North Africa. The foregoing estimate is an over all strength including reserves.

The disposition of the Axis Air Force is such as to permit the movement through two zones, (1) Sicily and (2) Spain. Operations could occur simultaneously.

The scales of effort are estimated as follows:

From Sicily - 350 aircraft
From Spain - 350 aircraft

700 total

It is estimated that the enemy's air attack from Sicily would be directed against Algeria and the attack from Spain in the direction of Casablanca.

It is believed that operations could commence when the decision to do so has been made.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:

RALPH C. SMITH,
Colonel, General Staff,
Executive Officer, G-2.

AS/G2
JCH/amf

December 24, 1941

An Estimate of possible Axis move into North and North-west Africa.

Should the Axis move into West and Northwest Africa their aircraft will form the advance element. Due to the availability of numerous bases and lines of communication through Spain, Sicily and North Africa this move will not occasion any serious difficulty for the Axis. Air Force requirements would not be great and could be furnished by the 2nd Air Fleet, now reported to be based in Italy, augmented by whatever Focke-Wolfe bombers the Axis decided to spare from France. (The above Air Fleet is estimated to comprise 400 aircraft, mostly bombers, and according to reliable information its strength will be increased shortly, probably with fighters. Its strength then will probably be between 700-800 aircraft.) The movement through two zones, (1) Sicily and (2) Spain, would occur simultaneously.

The force from Sicily of approximately 350 aircraft would occupy and operate from bases in Tunisia and Algeria thereby denying the Western Mediterranean to Allied forces. Complete occupation could be effected in two days and within two weeks effective operations could be conducted. It has repeatedly been demonstrated that surface craft cannot operate within range of determined attack by land based aircraft without aerial superiority. This cannot be secured by the British at this time. Obviously Gibraltar would be untenable as a Naval Base. In consequence the Axis would have a direct surface supply route to all ports in this theatre, hampered only by sporadic air and submarine attacks.

The force from Spain, of approximately 100 long range bombers, 200 single engine fighters and 100 twin engine fighters, would occupy consecutively the bases from Tangier to Dakar. This would require about one week, the distance involved being almost 1700 miles by air. Within another week effective operations could be conducted. Heavy bombers will probably be based at Dakar, Villa Cisneros, Cap Juby and Tangier, with single engine fighters occupying the adjacent auxiliary fields. Twin engine fighters would occupy the Canary and Cape Verde islands and serve as photo reconnaissance, light bombers and fighter protection for those bases. They could also escort heavy bombers operating from African bases. There are sufficient facilities on these islands to protect the powers which occupy them first. It is believed that French, Portuguese and Spanish forces would suggest the Axis forces in this theatre should the Allies attack them.

The requisite supply for all Axis forces in this theatre could easily be accomplished by air and sea transport.

U.S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET

COPY NO. _____

C.P.S. 2/2

10th February, 1942

COMBINED STAFF PLANNERS

SUPER GYMNAST

(previous reference C.P.S. 2/1)

Note by the Secretaries.

The enclosure, which sets out certain information and comments obtained by the British Joint Staff Planners from London, raises various further questions for discussion by the Combined Staff Planners.

C. T. SMITH

P.O.A. DAVISON

COMBINED SECRETARIAT.

Washington, D.C.

10TH FEBRUARY, 1942.

SUPER GYINASTPOLICY.

1. London defines the circumstances which are sine qua non to the whole plan as "a guarantee of no opposition by the Vichy French Fleet together with full information regarding all minefields laid in the approaches to French African ports". They add that it is also most desirable that all French warships shall have moved from Casablanca before the arrival of the first convoy so that all berths in the harbour may be clear.

SCALE OF AIR ATTACK.

2. The British Joint Intelligence Committee's view is that there is no imminent threat of air attack on Casablanca in the postulated circumstances. That even operating through Spain it is improbable that the German scale of effort would exceed 30 long range bombers by the end of the first month, although thereafter it might be built up more rapidly.

3. German and Italian air forces could to-day attack Tunisia. Scales of effort are estimated as follows:

German - 350 aircraft (of which 180 bombers)
Italian - 180 aircraft (of which 50 bombers
based on Sicily)

A possibility of a further 130 Italian fighters based on Tripoli (Libya).

4. The view in London is that the enemy's air attack from Spain would almost certainly be directed against the Algerian ports before reaching out as far as Casablanca. If this be so, there is little immediate threat to Casablanca when a British contingent is disembarked in Algeria.

EMPLOYMENT OF AIR FORCES.

5. General Alexander has expressed the view that the British air forces in Tunisia are inadequate. It is appreciated that General Fredendall, the Supreme Commander, has not been able to see his way to accepting the suggestion that certain U.S. air forces be allocated to General Alexander. However, having regard to the arguments put forward above as to the probable scale of air attack on Casablanca, it is thought that General Fredendall may be willing to reconsider the practicability of making some U. S. pursuit air forces available to the British in Tunisia or Algeria, after setting up his squadrons in the Casablanca area.

PORT CAPACITY.

6. Casablanca cannot accommodate 55 ships. Detailed examination has been made which shows that we must reduce our previous estimates. A detailed appreciation by the British Joint Planners in London is as follows:-

(a) As it is felt that 1/3 of the accommodation of the port must be allowed for French requirements, even during the unloading of the first convoy, it is estimated that a maximum of 14 M.T. storeships, 2 petrol ships, 1 fleet of oilers and 1 group of escorts can be accommodated inside the boom defence. 4 of these M.T. storeships must be loaded with coal or other bulk cargo, so that they can be dealt with at the coaling quay, and the remainder must not contain more than 25,000 tons dead weight stores if they

are to be unloaded in a 16 day cycle. It would be possible to unload 6 more ships artificially flattened and loaded only with M.T. provided the personnel were accommodated either at satellite ports such as Safi, or in the outer harbour in the area marked "prohibited anchorage" which is probably a controlled minefield area. This is still under investigation.

(b) Transit capacity is 4,000 tons a day. Allowing 1300 tons a day for French requirements this gives us 2700 tons per day. These figures (i.e. 25,000 tons stores, 10,000 tons coal, chiefly for French Railways, and 4,000 tons petrol) give an average of 2500 tons per day over a 16 day cycle. The allowance for building up reserves will therefore be small.

(c) The capacity of Casablanca each 16 day period is thus estimated at 25,000 tons stores, 10,000 tons coal, 4,000 tons petrol and 3,000 vehicles. The vehicle figures must be reduced to 2,100 if 6 extra M.T. ships cannot be accommodated. 3,000 vehicles are sufficient for about 8 personnel ships carrying up to 2,000 British troops in each 16 day cycle; and it is proposed to plan on this basis. Personnel convoys should arrive 4 days before M.T. stores convoys.

A/A DEFENCE.

7. It is pointed out that the number of heavy A/A guns in the A/A regiment detailed for the first convoy is 24. To add more will probably be difficult as it would involve another ship.

CONVOY PROGRAMME.

8. A revised convoy programme appears to be essential. General Alexander suggests that the British contingent should be maintained through Oran as long as possible so as to reduce the strain on Casablanca. This must however be subject to the proviso that all Allied Forces landed in Africa must be capable of being maintained through Casablanca should the Germans enter Spain. The British convoy programme to Oran is therefore dependent upon the British programme to Casablanca.

9. B-1 cannot now sail before D-24 owing to the release of shipping previously held in readiness. The fast portion of the British contingent, including at least two M.T. ships, cannot arrive before D-34, while the slow portion cannot arrive before D-38. London agrees that the first Casablanca convoy should be joint American-British, but they doubt the wisdom of planning to meet at sea.

10. The minimum British requirement for carrying A/A and the necessary administrative units is estimated at 4 personnel and 5 M.T. ships. Thereafter alternative British and American convoys are proposed - in that order and at 16 day intervals. British convoys to Oran will conform as long as the port can be used. Should the use of Oran be suddenly denied, any convoy which is en route will be diverted to safe anchorage until Casablanca can receive it.

11. Attached hereto (Annex 1) is a revised convoy programme based on the 16 day cycle referred to above.

DEFINITION OF OBJECTIVE.

12. It also seems desirable to confirm that there is identity of view as regards objective. The objective was agreed in Para. 2, ABC-4/2 WW(J.F.C.)2 by the Joint Planning Committee as follows:-

"We consider our primary object is to establish ourselves in Northern French Morocco as quickly as possible. This would provide a base from which Spanish Morocco could be occupied at short notice and thus block Germany's line of advance from Spain. The area would also form a base from which Allied control could be extended over all North Africa and into Europe".

ANNEX 1.

SUPER GYMNAST
PROVISIONAL CONVOY PROGRAMME

MOST SECRET

SHIPPING

CONVOY	PERSONNEL	M.T.	PERSONNEL	M.T.	PETROL	SPEED	ARRIVE	PORT	PROPOSED COMPOSITION	REMARKS
B 1 b	7000	1050	3	7	2	13	D34	Algiers or Oran	Inf. Bde. Group One Heavy and one light A.A. Regt. Three Fighter Sqdns. Ad- ministrative Units.	
B 2 b	16,000	2050	7	15	2	14	D60	do	Armd. Bde. Gp. Balance Div. Tps. L. of C.Tps.	
			4	5	2	13	D54	Casa- blanca	One Hy. & One Lt. A.A. Rgt. Docks & Adm. Units	Joins A can Al.
B 1 a	5,000	750				9	D38	do		
A 1	24,000	3,000				14	D34	do	Additional A.A. & Docks Units Two A.C. Sqns.	
B 2 a	6,000	1,200	3	8	2	9	D50	do		
						14	D54	do		
A 2	16,000	3,000	8	20	2	9	D86	do	Armd. Bde. Gp. Inf. Bde. Gp. Corps Tps.	
						14	D82	do		
						9	D86	do		
						14	D88	do		
						9	D114	do	Inf. Div.	
						14	D118	do		
						9	D130	do		
						14	D148	do	Inf. Bde. Gp. Balance Corps & L. of C. Tps.	
						9	D150			
						14	D182			
						9	D188			
						14	D190	do		
A 5	8,000	1,500	4	10	2	9				

D1 - Date loading of ships is ordered
A - American Convoys - B - British Convoys

February 10th, 1942

CCS 381. Germany
(2-13-42)

Copy No. 20

SECRET

February 14, 1942.

NOTE BY SECRETARY

The two attached papers, JPS 5 and JPS 5/1,
are transmitted to the Combined Intelligence Committee
with the request that a combined evaluation be prepared
of the two views set forth, for presentation to the
Combined Chiefs of Staff.

E. L. SIBERT

SECRET

Copy No. _____

J.P.S. 5February 3, 1942U.S. JOINT STAFF PLANNERSDIRECTIVESUMMARY OF RECENT JOINT INTELLIGENCE SUB-COMMITTEE'S
APPRECIATION OF GERMANY'S INTENTIONSNote by Secretary

In accordance with directive quoted herewith, enclosure is forwarded to the Joint Strategical Committee for appropriate action.

"It is desired that the attached "Summary of recent Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee's appreciation of Germany's intentions", received from the British, be forwarded to the Joint Strategical Committee for study and comment.

A copy of this document has been furnished the Joint Intelligence Committee for analysis.

The two Committees should collaborate.

L.R. GEROW
Brigadier General
Assistant Chief of Staff.

R.K. TURNER,
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy."

(Signed) L.R. McDOWELL
U.S. Member, Combined Secretariat

ENCLOSURE

NAVAL MESSAGE

IN

T.O.O. 0835A/30

Received 30/1/42

Time : 1531

Addressed: B.A.D., Washington 868
From: Admiralty.

UNCLAS 65

Following is a summary of recent Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee's appreciation of Germany's intentions.

1. Germany is becoming short of oil and her air force has been reduced to first line strength of approximately 4,000 opera-

SECRET

tional and 1,400 transport aircraft.

2. She has recently increased naval and air forces in the Mediterranean. Considerable number of submarines and small craft have arrived in this area and large stocks of oil have been accumulated at Mediterranean ports.

3. We believe the supply increase intended chiefly for protection of Axis communication with North Africa to neutralize Malta, and to insure against a successful British advance to the Tunis frontier.

4. On Russian front the initiative still in Russia's hands and German forces withdrawing under strong pressure. As yet, no sign of present Russian offensive exhausting itself. Until it does, it will be impossible for Germany to withdraw substantial forces from Russia to rest and refit so as to form a striking force for renewal of offensive on the Russian front or for large scale operations in other theatres of war.

5. On the contrary, we know Flak defenses in Ukraine are being strengthened at the expense of Roumania and that other air units including air force troops, recently withdrawn from Russian front are being hurriedly returned there after minimum time spent in rest and refit.

6. Owing to reduction in strength of German Air Force unlikely that Germany will be able to make available sufficient air force to contain Russians and at the same time undertake large scale operations elsewhere. Further, this weakness will compel Germany to limit her offensive to one major operation only where she might hope to concentrate on air force sufficient to give her local superiority. To achieve this she would have to reduce her air force elsewhere to a minimum required for security.

7. No evidence (German) striking force being created now, nor do we consider a striking force sufficient for large scale operation can be created so long as the Russian offensive is maintained. Assuming for the sake of argument that stabilization is reached by 15th February, earliest date by which division (includ-

SECRET

ing divisions which may be made available from detached squadrons, for large scale operations could be withdrawn, rested and re-stored, would be the 1st May. So far as Russia is concerned large scale operations unlikely to take place owing to thaw during April, and the consequently difficulty of movement.

Possible courses of German action.

8. (A) A renewed offensive along the whole Russian front. For reasons already given this is most unlikely, if not wholly impossible as yet.

(B) A thrust in the south towards Caucasia (while containing Russian army in north and centre).

Germany must secure, at the earliest opportunity possible substantial supplies of oil. She can only obtain fabric oil in Caucasia or Iraq. For reasons given below, Caucasia is the most likely major operation.

9. A thrust through Turkey (towards) Syria and thence to Iraq and/or Egypt. Advance through Turkey into Iraq would put Germany in possession of oil fields potentially capable of meeting her needs. Would deprive us of oil on which our Eastern Mediterranean naval position partly depends. Would bring Germany within striking distance of Abadan and open way to a further advance into Egypt. On the other hand transport of oil from Iraq would be more difficult than from Caucasia at least until Germany had a secure sea route through Eastern Mediterranean. Moreover, even if Turkey acquiesced in passage of German forces through her territory Germany would be undertaking new military commitments. Seems unlikely that Turkey would acquiesce unless Russian army defeated or we had suffered such reverses that she felt confident that Germany would win the war.

10. Operation in central and western Mediterranean areas (a) through Iberian Peninsula against Gibraltar and French North Africa. Advantage to be gained substantial but operation would involve Germany in another military commitment in theatre of war remote from main source of oil and other supplies. Occupation of

SECRET

Peninsula would subsequently be a heavy economic liability. This operation therefore appears likely, only in order to counter or forestall action against ourselves or America. (b) Through North Africa ports against Egypt from west, possibly in conjunction with an attack through Turkey. Germans will attempt to maintain and exploit their position in North Africa, and for this purpose reinforce Rommel with forces necessary. Presence of strong air force in central Mediterranean area would serve to neutralize Malta and protect communication with Tripoli. Germany may try to capture Malta.

11. Invasion of British Isles. It is unlikely that Germany could undertake so large and risky operation as long as Russia remains undefeated.

CONCLUSION

12. Most probable German major operation likely to be made through Ukraine (towards) Caucasus to obtain oil. Meanwhile every effort will be made to control the central and eastern Mediterranean and to maintain and (exploit) the position in North Africa.

13. Following is our estimate of force Germany would require for operation referred to in paragraph 5 to 11 above and of time that must elapse between beginning of withdrawal of divisions from Russia and concentration of force ready for attack in several theatres of operation. "Z" day is date on which withdrawal of divisions beginning:

(A) Renewed offensive against Russia.

(1) An offensive all along the Russian Front. We cannot as yet see possibility of this operation. Forces required more than Germans have got.

SECRET

(ii) Thrust in south towards Caucasia (while containing Russian armies in north and centre). Force required against Caucasia some 30 Divisions (of which some 4 to 6 armoured and 4 to 6 motorized) and 1500 aircraft. Earliest date by which this operation could be developed. Concentration on the southern sector Z upward $2\frac{1}{2}$ months. Fall of ROSTOV Z plus 3 months. Occupation of MAIKOP - TUAPSE area Z plus 4 to Z plus $4\frac{1}{2}$ months. Occupation of SROZNI area Z plus 5 months. Occupation of BATUM - BAKU area dependent on degree of resistance in Caucasia.

?(B) Thrust through Turkey towards Syria and thence Iraq and/or Egypt. Land force required 20 Divisions (including 4 armoured and 6 motorized). Air force required - if Germans decide to attack Turkey they would expect Turks to receive air assistance from ourselves. Unlikely therefore that Germans would attack until they had assembled, in area from central Mediterranean to Black Sea (which must be treated as a whole) some 1500 aircraft in addition to all available Italian aircraft.

Earliest date on which forces could be concentrated on Turkish Frontier. Z plus $2\frac{1}{2}$ months. Earliest date on which force could reach Syrian Frontier. Turkey acquiescent Z plus $4\frac{3}{4}$ months. Turkey resistance incalculable.

(C) Invasion of British Isles.

Land force required: 30 divisions (including 9 armoured exclusive of Divisions required for diversion.

Air force required: -Full first line strength, denuding all other theatres of war.

Naval forces required: Substantially the whole German Navy would be involved. Earliest date by which force could be concentrated in west. Z plus 3 to 4 months.

(D) Operations in Central and Western Mediterranean.

(i) Through Iberian Peninsula against Gibraltar and French North Africa. Land Air Forces required - since these operations only likely to be contemplated by Germans to forestall

SECRET

or counter Allied action, they would have to employ such forces as they could muster at the time. Timing would similarly depend on the state of affairs then existing.

(ii) Through North African ports against Egypt from west, possibly in conjunction with an attack through Turkey. Land force required - 7 divisions made up say as follows:- 2 German armoured divisions, 1 German motorized division, 1 Italian armoured division, 1 Italian motorized division, 2 Italian infantry divisions.

Assuming of Axis forces now in Libya, equivalent of 1 armoured, 1 motorized and 2 infantry division will still be in area. These are included in above. Air Force required - the force set out in sub paragraph (B) above would cover this operation. Earliest date by which force in TRIPOLITANA could be reinforced. Not using Tunisian ports - 3 months from date of embarkation. Using Tunisian ports - 1½ months from date of embarkation.

14. Above, putting into terms of CALENDAR, and assuming 15th February as earliest date on which substantial force can be withdrawn from Russia, gives earliest date for stage referred to above as follows:-

(a) 1. Earliest date of concentration on the south Russian sector 1st May.

2. Fall of Rostov 15th May.

3. Occupation of MAIKOP-TUAPSE area 15th June to 30th

4. Occupation of GROZNI area 15th July.

5. Occupation of BATUM - BAKU area, dependent on

degree of resistance in Caucasus.

(b) 1. Concentration on the Turkish frontier 1st May.

2. Earliest date on which forces could reach the

Syrian frontier - Turkey acquiescent - early August, Turkey

resisting - incalculable.

(c) Concentration of forces for invasion of U.K.

15th May to 15th June.

CCS 381 Germany (2-11-42)

COPY NO. _____

SECRETJ.F.S. 5/1FEBRUARY 11, 1942JOINT U.S. STAFF PLANNERSSUMMARY OF RECENT JOINT INTELLIGENCE SUB-COMMITTEE'S
APPRECIATION OF GERMANY'S INTENTIONSNote by Secretary

The enclosures, prepared by the Joint Intelligence Committee in collaboration with the Joint Strategical Committee, in accordance with directive of J.F.S. 5, is circulated for consideration by the Joint U.S. Staff Planners.

L. R. McDOWELL.

ENCLOSUREMEMORANDUM FOR JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE:

Subject: Comments on a British Appreciation of Germany's Intentions.

References: (a) Medal 65, a summary of a recent British Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee appreciation of Germany's intentions.
(b) Memorandum, Joint Staff Planners, February 2, 1942.

1. Reference (b) forwarded reference (a) to the Joint Intelligence Committee and the Joint Strategical Committee for collaborative study and comment. The Joint Strategical Committee has collaborated in the preparation of this paper, and concurs therein.

2. This Committee believes that Germany cannot undertake a major offensive elsewhere before having destroyed Russia's military power. It, therefore, agrees in general with the conclusions stated in paragraph 12 of the British J.I.C. appreciation. The most probable German major offensive operation during 1942 will be an attack on Russia intended to complete the destruction of the Russian Army and to gain access to the oil of the Caucasus. Meanwhile, every effort will be

SECRET

made to control the central and eastern Mediterranean and to maintain and exploit the position in North Africa.

3. This Committee's views regarding other hypotheses may be stated briefly as follows:

a. An operation through North African ports against Egypt from the west: Likely as a subsidiary undertaking, but not as the major effort. See paragraph 2.

b. An operation through the Iberian Peninsula against Gibraltar and French North Africa: To be undertaken only if necessary to counter an Allied initiative in that region.

c. A thrust through Turkey to Syria and thence to Egypt or Iraq: Unlikely.

d. Invasion of the British Isles: Most unlikely.

4. The considerations from which these conclusions are reached may be indicated by comment, seriatim, on the paragraphs of the British appreciation.

(1) While it is known that the German oil supply is strictly limited, it is believed that it is sufficient to meet the needs of military operations through 1942 at least. The Military Intelligence Division's estimate of German air strength is as follows:

Total aircraft in tactical groups	5094
In operational training units	2097
In schools	1498
In reserve	4195
In civil repair	<u>2097</u>
Total except transport	14981
Transport	<u>1700</u>
Total aircraft strength of G.H.F.	16681

These figures seem reasonable. They are 20 to 24 percent higher than those given in the British appreciation.

(2) Agreed.

SECRET

(3) Agreed, with recognition of an additional objective of ultimately gaining control of the Mediterranean.

(4) It is believed that Germany has already withdrawn the bulk of her forces from the Russian front and is now resting and re-equipping these troops in rear areas. The so-called Russian offensive has thus far met little except strong German rear guard action. Up to the present time the situation will not permit a conclusion that a major Russian offensive has been in operation.

(5) No comment.

(6) Wherever Germany has taken the initiative she has always assured herself of air superiority.

(7) No comments. See paragraph (4).

(8A) A renewed German offensive along the whole Russian front is certainly most unlikely, if not wholly impossible, at the present time, nor is it believed that it could be launched prior to 15 May.

(8B) Agreed, assuming that the word "containing" is used in an active sense. The thrust would be designed to split the Russian Army. The main effort would then be in the south toward the Caucasus. The containing action would depend on the capabilities of the Russian Army at that time.

(9) Turkey will be entirely realistic. If the situation is decidedly favorable to Germany at the given time, it is unlikely that Turkey would offer any resistance in the face of certain defeat.

(10A) Agreed.

(10B) Agreed.

(11) Agreed.

(12-14) See paragraph 5 immediately below:

5. a. "Z" and "D" days. (1) The British use a "Z" day, the date on which the Germans will begin to withdraw divisions from the Russian front to re-equip and reorganize them for later offensive action, as the starting point for their

SECRET

estimated German time-tables. This Committee considers "Z" day to be meaningless, inasmuch as the Germans rotate their divisions in line throughout the year and constantly strive to maintain fresh divisions available for service anywhere. Moreover, it is our opinion that numerous divisions as well as the bulk of the German air force in Russia have already been withdrawn to rest and refit.

(2) A more practical starting point would be a "D" day, that on which the Germans will resume a major offensive against Russia. This "D" day will be determined primarily by climatic conditions. From the Sea of Azov to Finland there is naturally a wide variation in weather conditions. Along the Black Sea coast the thaw should begin about the middle of March, whereas north of Moscow winter conditions will continue well into May. The thaw, usually combined with heavy rains, makes quagmires of the roads, which at best are none too good. On the front from Taganrog to Kursk, it is extremely doubtful that climatic conditions would permit the launching of a major offensive prior to 15 May. For that reason 15 May is taken as a probable "D" day.

b. Operations against the Caucasus. (1) The campaign which requires most thorough consideration is that envisaged by the British Committee in paragraphs 13 (A) 11 and 14 (a); that is, a drive on the Caucasus, while containing Russian forces in the center and north.

(2) A campaign in Russia is primarily a problem in logistics. The railroad-highway net will determine in large measure the number of troops that can be employed. From the line Kharkov-Taganrog three railways lead eastward to the line Kamensk-Rostov. From that line only one railway leads on to Stalingrad. In order to secure adequate rail facilities for a force advancing on the Caucasus, it becomes practically necessary to obtain use of the Kursk-Voronezh-Povorino-Stalingrad rail line. Thus there would be four railroads east from the line Kursk-Taganrog to the lateral Voronezh-Rostov railroad and two thence to Stalingrad.

SECRET

(3) Although the Germans supplement railways with heavy motor columns, it is inconceivable that even they can supply more than 20 divisions to each penetrating rail line. Accordingly, a maximum of 80 divisions could be maintained on the initial Kursk-Taganrog front, which is 400 miles long. For general global planning purposes, it is reasonable to assume one division for every 5 or 6 miles of front in a normal campaign, or 70 to 80 divisions on a 400-mile front. This agrees with the estimated maximum capacity of the railroad net. Thus the German main effort may be estimated as a mass of about 80 divisions advancing from the line Kursk-Taganrog.

(4) For purposes of general estimation, it may be assumed that the normal average advance in an operation of this nature would be limited to 100 miles a month, in alternate equal stages of movement and consolidation. (In the Russian offensive of 1941 the Germans covered approximately 500 miles in five months.)

(5) The offensive from Kursk-Taganrog against the Caucasus would probably take the form of a right wheel pivoting on Rostov, so that eventually this group of armies would change from an easterly direction to a southeasterly one along line of Don River between Rostov and Stalingrad. Within two weeks Rostov would probably have fallen. The drive to Stalingrad, however, might well take three or four months. If the elements of the German Army that reached Rostov in two weeks could well debouch therefrom, say within "D" plus 30 days, without awaiting the fall of Stalingrad, they would be definitely limited in strength to no more than 20 divisions. The front Stalingrad-Rostov calls for a force of nearer 40 divisions. These can be supported when Stalingrad is taken, as the rail line Stalingrad-Tikhoretsk indicates. The remaining 35 divisions of the original attacking force would be utilized in containing or assisting in containing the Russian Army in the north.

SECRET

(6) The advance from Rostov to the line Armavir-Maikop-Tuapse (150 miles) could be made in about $1\frac{1}{2}$ months; that is, about 2 months after "D" day, or by 15 July. This estimate is based on an assumption that the Kerch Peninsula is defended strongly and that the Germans are unable to force a landing at Novorossisk and Tuapse. These assumptions are considered reasonably sound. The occupation of Grozni could well occur 2 months later, that is "D" plus 4 months, or 15 Sept.

(7) If the campaign reached this point in accordance with this highly theoretical time schedule, it would find the Germans solidly in control of Stalingrad and the Volga north thereof, while the Russian Army defending the Caucasus would have fallen back beyond Grozni. A major decision would then arise as to whether the remnants of this Russian Army would withdraw towards Astrakhan or decide to continue the defense of the oil regions of Baku, falling back on the Trans-Caucasus and ultimately on Iran. It must be remembered that the Russian forces defending in this Caucasus area would then be hopelessly separated from the main Russian Armies, which would probably have withdrawn on the Kazan-Kuibyshev front.

c. Secondary operations in Russia. Containing action to prevent Russian forces in the north from disrupting the German advance toward the Caucasus is essential to the success of the main effort outlined in such detail above. It is believed that this would be accomplished by a secondary attack northeastward, generally along the Oka River, with a view to seizing Gorki and Kazan, driving the Russian forces north and east of the Volga River. By the same reasoning and consideration of time schedule it would seem that this maneuver would require about 4 months. The Russian forces, if all went well, would thus become hopelessly divided.

d. The Middle East. (1) Discussion of another likely secondary effort is pertinent. This effort would envisage heavy reinforcements to Rommel with a view to over-running Egypt,

SECRET

seizing the Suez Canal, driving eastward and threatening Basra. This large-scale double envelopment is of the type normally envisaged by the Germans. The drive through Egypt, with the present weakened strength of the Allied forces, would probably require not more than 20 division.

(2) If this gigantic maneuver was succeeding, the attitude of Turkey would no longer be in doubt. Rather than accept certain defeat, it is probable that the Turks would grudgingly permit the use of their railroads and highways by Germany.

e. Summary. Those time-tables are purely theoretical. They are meant to indicate the maximum rate of progress of which the Germans are apt to be capable. So much speculative data is involved, and so many imponderables, that rigid estimates as to forces and elapsed time required to reach various, distant objectives may be misleading and dangerous. If the Germans can maintain such a schedule, they can gain a major decision against Russia in 1942 and perhaps a decision in the Middle East as well. They would then be in a position to move on India in 1943, if they so elect. The Russian Army might disrupt the schedule. The outcome therefore depends more upon the relative combat value of Russian and German divisions than upon any other factor.

LUDWELL L. MONTAGUE,
Major, Cavalry,
Secretary, J.I.C.

CCS 385 (2-16-42)

U.S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET

FEBRUARY 16, 1942.

COPY NO. 19

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D. C.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMBINED INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

Subject: Possible Japanese action against
Australia and New Zealand.

The Combined Staff Planners directed the Secretaries to refer the attached papers (C.P.S. 10 and C.C.S. 18) to the Combined Intelligence Committee with the request that an agreed appreciation be furnished the Combined Planners based on the two views set forth in the papers attached. This request should be given higher priority than the request with reference to Super Gymnast.

E. L. SIBERT,
P. O. A. DAVISON,
Combined Secretariat.

CCS 385 (2-13-42)

U. S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET

COPY NO. _____

C.P.S. 10FEBRUARY 13, 1942.COMBINED STAFF PLANNERSPOSSIBLE JAPANESE ACTION AGAINSTAUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALANDNote by the Secretaries

The enclosure, prepared by the Joint Intelligence Committee, is circulated for consideration by the Combined Staff Planners.

(Signed) E. L. SIBERT,
" P. O. A. DAVISON,
Combined Secretariat.

ENCLOSURE

1. The reference directs that the Joint Intelligence Committee furnish the Combined Staff Planners with its comments on an appreciation of the subject enclosed in the reference.
2. The Committee agrees in substance with the conclusions of the Enclosure (paragraphs 2 and 11). Specifically, it believes that at this stage Japan would be content to deny the use of Torres Straits and to isolate Australia and New Zealand, without embarking on a major invasion of either country.
3. The Committee is in substantial agreement with the Enclosure's statement of conditions precedent to a major Japanese attack on Australia or New Zealand (paragraphs 3 and 4). In paragraph 4, however, the Enclosure hypothecates Japanese consolidation of a position including the Netherlands East Indies and islands eastward as far as New Caledonia, Fiji, and Samoa as prerequisite to further offensive operations. In J.I.C. Special Study No. 1, "Japanese Logistic Capabilities," this Committee

estimated that the Japanese would consolidate the Burma-Malaya-Netherlands East Indies-Mandates barrier before undertaking further offensive operations. Subsequent comment will be made with reference to hypothetical Japanese consolidation of the B-M-N-M barrier, as outlined in J.I.C. 1.

4. From the barrier, without undertaking a major offensive operation, Japan could deny the use of Torres Strait by neutralizing or occupying key points on the north coast of Australia. This coast is so inaccessible by land from the settled area of Australia and so accessible by sea from the Netherlands East Indies that it is, strategically, an integral part of the barrier rather than of Australia. From the barrier the Japanese could also raid the ports of Australia and New Zealand, as envisaged in paragraph 1 of the Enclosure. Operations to interrupt or harass supply routes from the United States should also be anticipated. It is not necessary to occupy Samoa, Fiji, or New Caledonia for that purpose.

5. Australia and New Zealand are sparsely inhabited white communities isolated from other whites by the 6,000 miles of ocean which separate them from the United States and from South Africa. Both are dependent on overseas communications for essential supplies. Their individual characteristics are as follows:

(a) Australia. In an area of 3,000,000 square miles there are only 7,000,000 Australians, nearly half of them in the five cities of Brisbane, Sydney, Melbourne, Adelaide, and Perth. The vital area is the southeastern corner of the continent, bounded by the line Brisbane-Adelaide. There are found the bulk of the population, industry, agriculture, communications facilities, and other utilities. Perth is the center of an isolated community on the west coast. The rest of the country is largely uninhabited desert.

The 12,000 mile perimeter of Australia is too long for all-around defense by the limited forces available. The terrain offers few serious obstacles. Communications are poor by American standards and virtually nonexistent outside of the vital area. A significant war industry has been developed, but it is rendered vulnerable by dependence on outside sources for essential materials.

(b) New Zealand, with a population of 1,600,000 in 100,000 square miles, is divided into two main islands incapable of mutual support. The terrain is rugged, but the perimeter is disproportionate to the area and the vital points are the coastal cities of Auckland, Wellington, Christchurch, and Dunedin.

6. By invasion and occupation of Australia and New Zealand Japan could gain the following advantages:

(a) The elimination of those countries from the Allied war effort.

(b) Their elimination as a bridgehead for counter operations against the barrier.

(c) Protection of the Japanese left flank in future operations for the control of the Indian Ocean.

(d) The satisfaction of territorial ambitions through the acquisition of territory attractive to emigrants.

(e) Acquisition of natural resources, especially iron and wool.

7. By invasion and occupation of Australia and New Zealand Japan would incur the following disadvantages:

(a) The extension of their flank and lines of communication across the front of their principal enemy, the United States, and the displacement of major forces away from their traditional enemy, Russia.

(b) The forces required for secure occupation would be disproportionate to the advantages gained.

(c) It would be a time-consuming operation, absorbing forces which might be employed more profitably elsewhere.

(d) The resistance of a white people in their homeland would be more determined than any yet encountered. They could expect no assistance from a fifth column.

(e) The operation would invite the United States and Russia to attack their flank and rear.

8. It is premature to estimate Japanese scales of attack on Australia and New Zealand (paragraph 6 of the enclosure). The Japanese have not yet fulfilled the agreed conditions prerequisite to such an attack. Until they have done so, neither the effect of their losses on forces available nor the effect of Allied counter measures on the forces required can be estimated with precision. An attempted landing in the populated sector of Australia or in New Zealand will assume the proportions of a major operation and will require control of the adjacent sea areas together with local air supremacy.

9. The Committee concludes that, although a major invasion of Australia or New Zealand is unlikely, enemy operations to deny the use of Torres Strait and to isolate the two countries are probable.

U.S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET

C.C.S. 18

COPY NO. _____

31ST JANUARY, 1942.

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

POSSIBLE JAPANESE ACTION AGAINST AUSTRALIA
AND NEW ZEALAND

Note by the Secretaries.

At the request of the representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff, the attached appreciation of possible Japanese action against Australia and New Zealand, which has been prepared by the Joint Intelligence Committee in London, is circulated for consideration of the Committee.

(Signed) V. DYKES.

L. R. McDOWELL.

Combined Secretariat.

Washington, D. C.

31st January, 1942.

ENCLOSURE

1. RAIDS

Raids by Cruiser and Armed Merchant Cruiser possible at any time against one or more principal ports on Coast of Australia and New Zealand, and might take following forms:-

- (a) Bombardment.
- (b) Attack by aircraft launched from these ships.
- (c) Interference with port approaches by minelaying.

(d) Attacks by midget submarines and Coastal Motor Boats launched from these ships.

Surprise attack by carrier-borne aircraft on concentration of shipping at Port Darwin, or ports further South, possible.

2. MAJOR OPERATIONS.

Japanese plans at this stage not thought to embrace major attack on Australia and New Zealand as distinct from raids as set out above. Only exception is attempt to occupy Darwin.

3. CONDITIONS

Before making major attack against Australia and New Zealand, Japanese Naval Staff would probably require following conditions fulfilled: (a) Singapore in Japanese hands or beleaguered and Java, Sumatra and Philippine Islands in Japanese hands.

(b) Japanese control extended in South China Sea by occupying key points in Islands of East Indian Archipelago as far as Timor inclusive, and Islands of New Guinea, New Caledonia, Fiji and Samoa group.

(c) No hostilities with Russia or situation on that front not such as to require material for strengthening of Japanese force in that area.

(d) (?To) retain power to transport large bodies of troops over long line of sea communications, without risk of serious loss from Allied action.

4. SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS

Japanese strategy at present seems to be aiming especially at (a) and (b) above as rapidly as possible. If successful Japan will be established in powerful advanced Naval and air positions with safe lines of communications to Home bases, will also threaten communications between America and New Zealand and thus be strongly placed to secure major gains and proceed with further aims as follows:- (a) Full scale operations against Burma (for which preliminary moves already in progress) and thence possibly towards India.

(b) Full scale operations against Australia and/or New Zealand.

(c) Attack against Russia - which we consider improbable. It is too conjectural to say, at this stage, which of the two remaining courses Japanese would adopt, but they would be unlikely to adopt more than one at the same time. Operations against Burma, with limited objective as far as say, Rangoon, need not await outcome of operations in Malayan Archipelago and would not preclude simultaneous operations against Australia and New Zealand.

5. GENERAL METHODS OF ATTACK.

(a) Before attempting any major operation against Australia and New Zealand, Japanese likely to attempt capture of Darwin, denying to us only possible bases in Northern Australia. Due to its isolated position Darwin is an attractive target for capture before it is strengthened and while our military strength in this area comparatively weak.

(b) If and when Japanese decide to develop major operations against Australia and New Zealand operations likely to take form of simultaneous landings at, or in vicinity of, important ports, with a view to gaining stranglehold on key points and communications. Any attempt at occupation of Australia or New Zealand would probably be mainly confined to Coastal area.

6. SCALES OF ATTACK.

(a) NAVAL. Close escort, to protect convoys and subsequently cover each landing, might consist of:- 6 Cruisers, 2 Aircraft Carriers and possibly 2 Seaplane Carriers, 20 Destroyers.

Main Japanese Fleet would be disposed so as to intercept any large scale interference by Allies.

(b) MILITARY. Some 12 Japanese Divisions could be made available and transport for operations against Australia and New Zealand, and following might be scales of attack in each phase:-

(i) Darwin. Attack on Darwin likely to be made by one to two divisions transported in landing craft and small craft. Initial landings carried out by Brigade groups.

(ii) Australia. 6 or 7 divisions likely to make attack on continent of Australia, landing up to 2 divisions at 2 or more key points simultaneously. Initial landings would be carried out by Brigade groups in landing craft transported to assembly positions in landing craft carriers.

(iii) New Zealand. From 4 to 5 divisions would make attack similar to (ii) above.

If attacks on Australia and New Zealand not simultaneous, scale of attack against either could be increased accordingly. Availability of special landingcraft would not be limiting factor for any of above operations. Large numbers of small craft such as Pearl Harbor Luggers small Trading schooners available in Caroline Islands which could be used for this purpose.

(c) AIR. Following scales of attack based on assumption that no developments had occurred on Russian front which would justify Japanese reducing Air Force retained to meet potential threats in that theater of war.

(i) To cover landing and obtain aerodromes from which to develop operations on shore, Japanese might support landings with some 5 or 6 aircraft carriers, and similar number of seaplane carriers, capable of carrying some 250 aircraft, comprising say 100 fighters and 150 dive and torpedo bombers and up to 100 seaplanes.

(ii) As soon as port captured, Japanese could bring, by ships and possibly overland from Darwin area, if intermediate landing grounds had been established, additional land based aircraft. Assuming operations in Malaya and Philippines successfully concluded, they might make available some 400 of such aircraft and possibly in addition some 30 long range flying boats.

7. Above scales of attack represent maximum considered possible in conditions most favourable to Japanese. Conditions in paragraph 5 must first be fulfilled, and operations involved represent formidable task. In these operations, combat losses and waste of aircraft would be heavy.

8. OPERATIONS IN BURMA.

Necessity of retaining forces on northernmost front against possible Russian attack in spring and garrisoning of China and other territory captured, all representing heavy drain on Japanese resources, particularly in air.

9. In these circumstances Japanese might hesitate before attempting occupation of continents such as Australia or even the smaller territory of New Zealand, particularly in view of their experience in China.

10. Such further dissipation of their forces might seriously jeopardize Japanese power to hold territory gained, in view of increasing strength of Americans.

11. CONCLUSION.

It seems likely that Japan will at this stage be content with endeavouring to isolate Australia and New Zealand without embarking on major operations to southwards except for capture of Darwin. Attack on Darwin likely in any event.

Joint Intelligence Com - 4990-
 Summary
 x Information
 x COI

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

INTEROFFICE MEMO

File

DATE March 20, 1942

FROM: Edward S. Mason

TO: Colonel William J. Donovan

SUBJECT: Types of Information Wanted from the COI for the JIC Daily Summary

This morning I had a discussion with David Bruce concerning the type of information which might be available in SIS for the use of the Joint Intelligence Committee Daily Summary. At his request I have prepared the accompanying memorandum on this question for submission to him and to Mr. Barker.

E. S. M.

Edward S. Rosen

March 22, 1942

Mr. James P. Snyder 34
Mr. David Bruce

Trans. of Information Requested From the JIC For the JIC Daily Summary

The Joint Intelligence Committee has requested the cooperation of the Secretary's Office in assembling material which may be of use in the JIC Daily Summary. This material, presumably must come in the main from I and A and SIA.

The JIC Daily Summary is mainly factual and is concerned with the military situation and with such closely related political, economic, and other data as will throw light on the military situation. It is particularly interested in factual material which will indicate the trend or direction of events. For example, information on the progress of a situation all the time of submission is a matter of little interest on the other hand, information indicating increasing Japanese submarine strength in that locality or information on the progress of operations in areas where losses have been about would be important.

Some further indication of the type of material useful for the Daily Summary may be given by the following list of subjects treated in the March 19 and 20 issues:

1. Report of French Colonial troops being transported from India to Singapore.
2. Japanese submarine activities in the Indian Ocean.
3. Military position in Burma.
4. The transport by land of reinforcements from India to Burma.
5. Reported concentration of Japanese forces on the Northern New Guinea Coast.
6. Negotiations between Argentine War Minister and his Government over the sinking of South American ships.
7. Action of Uruguay in calling German Steamship Neutral.
8. Incidents of German Warships Marinka, Admiral Scherer and Prinz Eugen.
9. Restrictions by the Portuguese Government on air flights over the Azores.

March 29, 1942

L. A. Rosen

J. P. Hunter
D. Rosen

-2-

Memorandum

1. Conditions for success of the Gairy Mission to India.
2. Indications of Japanese naval intentions in the Indian Ocean with estimate of Japanese naval strength in that area.
3. Position of British, Chinese, and Japanese forces in Burma.
4. Bombing operations by Australian and Japanese air forces in the area north of Australia.
5. Intensive air and sea reconnaissance by the Japanese Navy.
6. Estimate of number of submarines operating in Western Atlantic waters.
7. Intensification of French German relations.
8. Indications of recent discussions between Spain and Germany for Spanish neutrality.



SECRET

April 6, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

The Board of Economic Warfare is in agreement with the general conclusions stated in the Admiralty message of March 27, 1943 on the Japanese economy position in the light of the conquest of Malaya and the East Indies. The following comments, however, have a bearing on the conclusions reached:

(a) Indo-China has a normal export surplus of rice amounting to 1,000,000 tons annually; Thailand, 1,100,000 tons. Japan's import requirements are from 800,000 to 1,000,000 tons annually in order to maintain her present reserve stocks.

(b) Japanese oil stocks as of January 1, 1943 are estimated as being sufficient for about 18 months or until the middle of 1943 on the basis of the present rate of consumption. Quantities of oil fields and refineries captured varied in degree, being most successful in South-East territory. The one exception was the Pindjoe refinery of the Royal Dutch Shell at Palembang in Sumatra which was reported captured intact with oil stocks totaling about 2,000,000 barrels. These stocks included:

100,000	Barrels of semi-refined
100,000	• crude oil
100,000	• kerosene
100,000	• turbine engine motor gas
100,000	• motor fuel
100,000	• heavy engine
100,000	• light diesel
100,000	• heavy diesel
100,000	• aviation gasoline
100,000	• power oil

The Pindjoe refinery has an aviation gasoline plant with a reported capacity of 60 to 70,000 tons of 100 octane aviation fuel per year.

(c) Consideration should be given to the Tachien fields in North-east China. The oil produced from these wells is a natural bunker fuel, requires no processing, and can be pumped direct into the ships' bunkers. The known production of the Tachien fields is about 9,000,000 barrels monthly.

(d) The statement that Balikpapan and Sumatra oil fields are most important as oil supplies for the manufacture of explosives probably refers to the total content of the crude oil used in the manufacture of T.N.T. If this factor is considered of importance, we can explore this entire region and turn to a comprehensive analytical analysis of the various crude oils produced in the East East Indies.

- 2 -

(2) Exports of coal from China to Japan for the seven months in 1941 were 2,374,000 tons, of which approximately 85 per cent came from Chingwangtao. Coal exported from Chingwangtao is an excellent coking coal and of considerable importance to Japanese industry.

The movement of vessels from Chingwangtao to Japanese industrial areas except for the short distance from landing point to Dairen is a coast-wise traffic and the lane of traffic well protected.

CMB/p